Abstract
Introduction
How does strategic managerial delegation in oligopoly affect the timings of technology adoption? Does that depend on the mode of product market competition? Is there any role of the type of incentive schemes offered to managers in the case of delegation? This paper attempts to answer these questions.
It is widely observed that firms often do not adopt a technology as soon as it becomes available.
Instead, firms delay to adopt new technology and the length of such delay varies across industries as well as across firms in the same industry. Several studies have attempted to explain this phenomenon.
2 This stream of literature offers useful insights to understand the implications of various factors, such as uncertainty regarding the value of newly available technology (Jensen, 1982; Balcer and Lippman, 1984; Bhattacharya et al., 1986; Jensen, 2004) , strategic interaction between sellers and buyers of technology and their market powers (Stoneman and Ireland, 1983; Ireland and Stoneman, 1986; Rivas 2010) , pre-commitment by firms in oligopoly and decreasing cost of technology adoption over time (Reinganum, 1981a& 1981b Quirmbach, 1986) , preemption incentive in oligopoly (Fudenberg and Tirole,1985; Riordan and Salant, 1994) , informational externality (Chamley and Gale, 1994) , network externality (Choi and Thum, 1998) , technological breakthrough versus improvement (Doraszelski, 2004) , mode of product market competition (Milliou and Petrakis, 2011) , etc., to firm's optimal timing of technology adoption.
However, to the best of our knowledge existing models of technology diffusion do not allow for the possibility of delegation of authority within firms, although it is a common phenomenon in modern firms that face imperfect competition.
It is well argued that in oligopoly managerial delegation within firms, which arises due to strategic reasons, has significant effect on firms' profits. Moreover, the sign and magnitude of the effect of strategic managerial delegation on profits depend on the mode of product market competition, price or quantity, and on the type of incentive schemes considered (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Miller and Pazgal, 2001) . 3 It implies that managerial delegation is likely to affect firms' incentives to adopt new technology. Therefore, it seems to be important to examine the implications of managerial delegation on timings of technology adoption, by considering different types of incentive schemes, under alternative modes of product market competition. In order to address these issues, in this paper we extend the analysis of Milliou and Petrakis (2011) to allow for strategic managerial delegation.
We consider that there is a differentiated products duopoly with symmetric firms that initially employ the same production technology. Each of the two owners of firms contemplates on adopting a newly available cost-reducing technology, which has decreasing adoption-cost over time, and decides the timing of technology adoption. However, in each firm the task to set price or 2 See Hoppe (2002) for an extensive survey of the literature on timing of adoption of new technologies. 3 We note here that, other than due to strategic reasons, managerial delegation may arise due to existence of asymmetric information between an owner and her manager and their conflicting objectives as well (Holmstrom, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1979; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004) . However, to keep the analysis tractable we consider a complete information scenario and focus on strategic managerial delegation in this paper. We consider that the owner of a firm may delegate the authority to decide the magnitude of the strategic variable, quantity or price, depending on the exogenously determined mode of product market competition to her manager by offering the manager an appropriately designed incentive scheme. However, owner of each firm retains the authority to decide the timing of technology adoption.
Following the literature on strategic managerial delegation, we assume that the managers are risk neutral and managerial market is perfectly competitive. In order to examine the role of the nature of delegation contracts, we consider two types of incentive schemes, separately. First, we consider that the owner of each firm offers the incentive scheme of following form.
where = − denotes the profit of firm i (without deducting the fixed of technology adoption, if any), = denotes the sales revenue of firm and is the incentive parameter chosen by the owner of firm i, as in Fershtman and Judd (1987) . That is, the incentive scheme is a linear combination of own profit and own sales revenue. We refer this incentive scheme as 'ownperformance' based incentive scheme. Next, we consider that the owners offer 'relativeperformance' based incentive schemes of the following form, as in Miller and Pazgal (2001) .
where and are the profits of firm i and firm j, respectively, and is the incentive parameter chosen by the owner of firm i.
Own-performance based delegation contracts
Let us first consider that each owner offers 'own-performance' based incentive scheme, as in (1), to her manager. As mentioned before, the manager of each firm sets its quantity or price, depending on the exogenously determined mode of product market competition, in each date, while the decision of timing of technology adoption resides with the owner. That is, we assume that at time = 0 the owner of firm can credibly pre-commit its date of technology adoption , = 1, 2. The stages of the game involved are as follows.
Stage 1: At time t = 0, the owners independently and simultaneously decide the timing of technology adoption, , so that the present values of their respective profits are maximized.
The owners make this decision by considering their profits over an infinite time horizon.
Stage 2: At each point of time , each firm's owner independently and simultaneously designs the incentive scheme ( ) by choosing the incentive parameter ( ), so that her profit at that time , ( , = 1,2 ; ≠ ) is maximized, for her manager and delegates the task to set the price or quantity depending on the mode of product market competition. Without any loss of generality we consider that, if firms adopt the new technology sequentially, the owner of firm 1 commits to adopts at an earlier date than the owner of firm 2: 1 < 2 .
Therefore, we can write the stage 1 problems of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, as in (3) and (4). From the first order conditions of (3) and (4) respectively. Note that 1 and 2 are the marginal gains, i.e., incremental profits, from technology adoption of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, when the product market competition is of type . (5) and (6) implies that the optimal timing of technology adoption for firm i (= 1, 2) is such that its marginal gain ( ) from adoption is equal to its cost of waiting (− 
Now, given the timings of technology adoption by the two competing firms, under Cournot competition with 'own-performance' based delegation contractsfirm i's equilibrium incentive parameter, output and profit are, respectively, as follows. 
where the superscript 'CD' indicates Cournot equilibrium under 'own-performance' based delegation contracts. Needless to mention here that , = 1 corresponds to the case of no delegation. Comparing the increamental profits of firm i under Cournot competition with delegation ( ) and without delegation ( ), we obtain the following proposition. Proof: See Appendix.
The intution behind this result are as follows. In the case of Cournot competition without delegation, technology adoption by a firm has two effects. First, it reduces the marginal cost of the adopting firm, which adversely affects the output of the rival firm and, thus, increases the adopting firm's profit. That is, there is astrategic effect of technology adoption on adopting firm's profit, which is positive under Cournot competition. It is easy to check that the strategic effect is weaker in the case of higher degree of product differentiation, since in that case interdependence between markets of good 1 and good 2 is lower. Second, technology adoption by a firm reduces the adopting firm's marginal cost, which has direct positive effect on output and, thus,on profit of the adopting firm. In other words, other than strategic effect, there is adirect effect of technology adoption on adopting firm's profit, which is also positive under Cournot competition.Now, since in the case of Cournot competition with delegation the equilibrium incentive parameters are less than one ( , < 1), each firm behaves more aggreesively in the product market, i.e., set higher quantities,and earns lower profitsin the case of managerial delegation compared to that in absence of delegation. Further, in the case of delegation output of a firm is less sensitive to its marginal cost compared to that in absence of delegation. Thus, thepositive direct effect of technology adoption on adopting firm's profit reduces due to delegation. However, due to delegation, the technology adopting firm acquires greater market share than the non-adopting firm, which strengthens the positive strategic effect. Also, note that the optimal incentive parameter is lower in the case of higher degree of product substitutability 4 and the extent of increase in market share of the adopting firm due to delegation is higher, if the new technology is more effective (i.e., if d is larger). Therefore, the positive strategic effect of technology adoption on adopting firm's profit is stronger under delegation, if the degree of product substitutability is higher and/or new technology is more effective. As a result, if products are sufficiently close substitutes or the new technology brings about a large reduction in marginal cost, increase in strategic effect due to delegation over compensates the decrease in direct effect due to delegation.
Thus, in the case of Cournot competition the first firm adopts the technology sooner under delegation compared to that under no delegation, if products are close substitutes or reduction in marginal cost due to technology adoption is sufficiently large. Following the same logic, the second firm also adopts the technology sooner (latter) under delegation than that under no delegation, if products are sufficiently close substitutes (differentiated). Otherwise, if products are neither sufficiently close substitutes nor sufficiently differentiated, effect of managerial delegation on the timing of adoption by the second firm depends on the effectiveness of new technology. Now, we turn to examine the implications of 'own-performance' based incentive schemes on rates of technology adoption under Bertrand competition. In this case, the equilibrium incentive parameter, price and profit of firm i are, respectively, as follows. 
where the superscript 'BD' indicates Bertrand equilibrium under 'own-performance' based delegation contracts. Needless to mention here that we get equilibrium prices and profits under (2011) is robust to the introduction of 'own-performance' based managerial delegation contracts in firms. Note that, while both direct effect and strategic effect of technology adoption reinforces firms' incentives to adopt new technology under Cournot competition, these two effects work in opposite directions under Bertrand competition. However, since competition is more intense under Bertrand competition, positive direct effect of marginal cost reduction due to technology adoption on the first adopting firms' profit is much more prominent under Bertrand competition than that under Cournot competition, unless products are sufficiently differentiated. This is true regardless of whether there are 'own-performance' based managerial delegation contracts in firms or not, since such delegation strengthens (weakens) direct effect and weakens (strengthens) strategic effect of technology adoption under Bertrand (Cournot) competition. As a result, when products are close substitutes, the first firm always adopts the new technology sooner under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. The opposite is true, when products are sufficiently differentiated, since due to increase in degree of product differentiation direct effect of technology adoption reduces to a greater extent under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
For the second adopter, direct effect of technology adoption under Bertrand competition is lower than that under Cournot competition even when products are close substitutes. This is because, a reduction in second firm's marginal cost further intensifies price under-cutting under Bertrand competition, but under Cournot competition the first firm responds by setting a lower output. As a result, the gain in profit of the second firm due to technology adoption is higher under Cournot competition than that under Bertrand competition, irrespective of the degree of product differentiation and whether there are 'own-performance' based managerial delegation contracts in firms or not.
Relative-performance based delegation contracts
We now turn to examine whether rankings of rates of technology adoption under Cournot and
Bertrand equilibria in the case of strategic managerial delegation are sensitive to the form of incentive schemes offered to managers. In order to do so, we consider an alternative scenario in which owners of each firm offer 'relative-performance' based incentive schemes as given by equation ( 
where superscripts 'BRD' and 'CRD' denote, respectively, 'Bertrand competition with relativeperformance based delegation contracts' and 'Cournot competition with relative-performance based delegation contracts', , = 1, 2 and ≠ .
From (10) it is evident that, for any given marginal costs and , in the case of 'relativeperformance' based incentive schemes equilibrium profit of firm i (=1, 2) under Bertrand competition is the same as that under Cournot competition. In other words, Bertrand competition and Cournot competition yield the same level of profit in the case of strategic managerial delegation with 'relative-performance' based incentive schemes, as in Miller and Pazgal (2001) .
The reason is as follows. Cournot (Bertrand) equilibrium profits are lower (higher) in the case of strategic managerial delegation than that in the case of no delegation, regardless of whether owners offer 'own-performance' based incentive schemes or 'relative-performance' based incentive schemes to their respective managers in the case of delegations. However, unlike as in the case of 'own-performance' based incentive schemes, owners enjoy sufficient control over their managers in the case of 'relative-performance' based incentive schemes so that their equilibrium profits are invariant to modes of product market competition (Miller and Pazgal, 2001) . Therefore, in the present scenario, we have the following. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model to examine We have also shown that, though existence of 'own-performance' based delegation contracts in firms has differential impacts on timings of technology adoption under alternative modes of product market competition, the ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in terms of speed of technology diffusion under 'own-performance' based delegation contracts remain the same as that under no-delegation. Under each of these two scenarios, while the second firm adopts the new technology sooner in the case of Cournot competition than that in the case of Bertrand competition regardless of the degree of product differentiation, the first firm adopts the new technology sooner (later) in the case of Bertrand competition than that in the case of Cournot competition unless the degree of product differentiation is high (low). In contrast, under strategic managerial delegation with 'relative-performance' based incentive schemes, speed of diffusion of new technology does not depend on the mode of product market competition, price or quantity.
In this paper we have considered diffusion of productivity enhancing new technology and assumed that firms can pre-commit the timing of technology adoption. It seems to be interesting to extend the present analysis to the case of product quality enhancing new technology and to test the sensitivity of our results in alternative scenario in which owners cannot credibly pre-commit the timing of technology adoption. These are beyond the scope of the present paper. We leave these for future research.
Proof of Proposition 1
Using the expressions for equilibrium profits of firm 1 under Cournot competition with and without delegation from (8), we get the increamental profits of firm 1 due to technology adoption under Cournot competition with delegation and without delegation, respectively, as follows. Next, using the stage 3 equilibrium profits from (8), we obtain the incremenatal profits of firm 2 due to technology adoption under Cournot competition with delegation and without delegation are, respectively, as follows. iv) If 0 < < 0.8467, 2 < 2 .
[QED]
Proof of Proposition 2
From the equilibrium profits of firm 1 and firm 2 under Bertrand competition without delegation and with delegation, given by (9), we obtain the incremental profits of firms due to technology adoption as follows. 
